Bibliographical data for
Author
Title of Edited Collection
Open MIND
Editors
Publication Date
January 2015
Publication Place
Frankfurt am Main, Germany
ISBN
9783958570054
Abstract
In this study I argue for the following claims: First, it’s best to think of subjective character as the self-acquaintance of each instance of consciousness—its acquaintance with itself. Second, this entails that all instances of consciousness have some intrinsic property in virtue of which they, and not other things, bear this acquaintance relation to themselves. And, third, this is still compatible with physicalism as long as we accept something like in re structural universals; consciousness is a real, multiply instantiable, natural universal or form, but it likely has a highly complex, articulated structure, and “lives” only in its instances. In order to make these cases, I give a characterization of subjective character that accounts for the intuition that phenomenal consciousness is relational in some sense (or involves a subject-object polarity), as well as the competing and Humean intuition that one of the supposed relata, the subject-relatum, is not phenomenologically accessible. By identifying the subject with the episode or stream of consciousness itself and maintaining that consciousness is immediately self-aware (“reflexively” aware), these competing intuitions can be reconciled. I also argue that it is a serious confusion to identify subjective character with one’s individuality or particularity. I argue that deeper reflection on the fact that consciousness has only incomplete self-knowledge will allow us to see that certain problems afflicting acquaintance theories, like the one I defend, are not the threats to certain forms of physicalism that they might seem to be. In particular, I briefly consider the Grain Problem and the apparent primitive simplicity of the acquaintance relation itself in this light.
Keywords
Acquaintance,
Consciousness,
Direct realism,
First-order representationalism,
For-me-ness,
Harder problem,
Heidelberg school,
Higher-order representationalism,
Individuality,
Individuation,
Intrinsic property,
Mineness,
Naturalize,
Particularity,
Phenomenal consciousness,
Phenomenal intentionality,
Physicalism,
Qualitative character,
Reflexive awareness,
Reflexivity,
Relational property,
Representation,
Representationalism,
Same-order representationalism,
Self-acquaintance,
Self-knowledge,
Self-representation,
Sense of self,
Sense-datum theory,
Stream of consciousness,
Structural universals,
Subject,
Subjective-character,
The grain problem,
Transparency intuition